Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction

The decisiveness and confidence required of leaders would initially seem to be at odds with the humility and deliberation of superforecasters. Therefore, there is the question of whether superforecasters truly are useful models for leaders who must foster a presence and act swiftly to achieve their goals in the face of opposition. However, Tetlock and Gardner suggest that, without superforecaster traits, leaders will make arrogant, hasty decisions and fail, and without leaders, superforecasters might lose their way. This chapter looks at how to reconcile these opposing traits and how elements of superforecasting enhance leadership.

This leader-superforecaster dynamic is nowhere more evident than in the 19th-century Prussian army, where Helmuth von Moltke gained victory over Denmark, Austria, and France by embracing uncertainty and doubt. Moltke knew that the best laid plans would change in battle and that this meant even the humblest foot soldier had to show initiative. Thus, junior members of the Prussian army were invited to come up with their own solutions and present those solutions to their superiors. In the long term, the need for decisive action was counterbalanced with elements that allowed for independent thinking.

While this principle of independence seems the opposite of the image of the Nazis’ lockstep war machine commanded by Adolf Hitler, the Nazis inherited it during World War II. For a time, the ability for every man to think for himself and capitalize on uncertainty helped the German war effort. However, Hitler’s lack of humility and his direct control of the military were factors in the downturn of the Nazis’ campaign. The authors seem aware that a reader may question their choice to spotlight one of recorded history’s most debased organizations as a paradigm of good leadership. However, they argue that superforecasters must be aware of the cunning and effective strategies of opposing forces so that they can learn from others’ critical thinking skills.

It was as late as the 1980s before American generals adopted the German’s Wehrmacht policies and decentralized. The empowerment of ground commanders was key to American success in Iraq in 2003. General David Petraeus echoed Moltke when he said that flexible thinking was essential, especially where uncertainty was a given. Petraeus was also leery of the dichotomy between doers (like leaders) and thinkers (like superforecasters) because “leaders must be both” as they seek to execute the right move while avoiding the wrong one (224). Moltke’s ideology can also be found in modern businesses where leaders are clear about what they want their employees to achieve but don’t micromanage employees’ processes.

Like superforecasters, leaders must counterbalance their projection of confidence with intellectual humility, whereby they are honest about the distinction between what they know and don’t know. This balancing act entails the recognition that “reality is profoundly complex, that seeing things clearly is a constant struggle, when it can be done at all, and that human judgment must therefore be riddled with mistakes” (228). While this doubt helpfully inspires the reflection needed for good judgment, self-confidence allows taking the requisite action.