The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Beneficence is best understood as the inclination to do good deeds. Unlike justice, which is essential to a society’s peace and order, beneficence is “always free,” meaning that it “cannot be extorted by force” (81).

Justice amounts to a sacred regard for the interests of all. Unlike beneficence, justice “may be extorted by force,” for “the violation of justice is injury” (82). Furthermore, the “rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or modifications,” which means they are both fixed and universal (82).

Magnanimity denotes supreme fortitude under serious emotional distress. A “great and exalted virtue,” magnanimity “demands much more than that degree of self-command, which the weakest of mortals is capable of exerting” (33). Indeed, magnanimity “appears always so divinely graceful,” for the man who maintains his composure despite catastrophe “appears to be more than mortal” (54).

Propriety signifies proper behavior. Whereas virtue is “admired and celebrated,” propriety ranks among those qualities that “simply deserve to be approved of” (33). In Smith’s view, some ancient philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, confused propriety with virtue. Smith argues that “though propriety is an essential ingredient in every virtuous action, it is not always the sole ingredient” (270).

Prudence is the careful and consistent application of our thoughts and energies to actions that are best for us. It is the “union” of “self-command” to “superior reason and understanding” (177). We act with prudence when “we abstain from present pleasure” and choose instead to practice “frugality” and “industry,” such as when we are responsible with our money or work hard.

Self-command means control of our emotions and behavior. Awareness of the impartial spectator teaches us to practice self-command. When we do this under severe duress, we demonstrate magnanimity. Self-command, Smith observes, “is not only itself a great virtue, but from it all the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre” (224).